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MARTEN H. A. VAN HEUVEN*

Civil Emergency Planning in NATO
Introduction
NATO has recently enjoyed its share of attention. In February, President Nixon started his European tour with a highly successful visit to the
Headquarters of the Organization in Brussels. In April, NATO Ministers
in Washington celebrated the 20th anniversary of the signing of the NATO
Treaty. Even the Soviet Union took public-though discordant-note of
this occasion.' Public and information media have of late also shown much
2
interest in the Alliance.
These events have accentuated public awareness of the dual role of
NATO in today's world: the defense of the West and the search for a
stable peace with the East, or, in convenient shorthand, defense and
ddtente. 3 The role of NATO as a defense alliance and as a mechanism for
continuing political consultation is generally fairly well-known.4 The purpose of this report is to describe briefly the growing role of NATO in a
*Mr. van Heuven is a Foreign Service Officer currently assigned to the United States
Mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium. The opinions expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of the United States Government.
1
A UPI report of April 9, 1969, datelined Moscow, said: "The Soviet Union tonight
marked the 20th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by denouncing it as
an aggressive force aimed at the Soviet Union, a brake on peaceful solutions of international
problems, a well-spring of tension." According to the report, the Soviet statement, distributed
by the news agency Tass, characterized NATO as "the organizer of subversive activity.
espionage, ideological subversion and the inspirer of attempts at counter-revolutionary coups
in socialist countries." The last phrase appears to be an unveiled reference to the recent
events
in Czechoslovakia.
2
See the special section called NA TO, A Special Report on the Twentieth Anniversary of
the Alliance,
The Times (London). April 10, 1969.
3
See Report on the Future Task of the Alliance (the so-called Harmel Report), NATO
Information Service (1968). and the communiques issued by Ministers after the December
1967, June 1968, November 1968 and April 1969 meetings of the NATO Council. NATO
Press Service, Press Comminiqu6 M4(67)3; NATO Press Service, Press Release M2(68)4/1:
NATO Press Service, Press Comminiqu6 M3(68)1: and NATO Press Service. Press Release
M2(69)4. See also Cleveland, NATO After Czechoslovakia, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 251
(1969).
4
See generally STANLEY, NATO IN TRANSITION (1965). and Fox. NATO AND THE
RANGE OF AMERICAN CHOICE (1967). See also KISSINGER, THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP
(1965), and OSGOOD, NATO-THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE (1962).
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heretofore little-known but interesting area, namely, civil emergency planning. 5
Definition of Civil Emergency Planning
Briefly stated, the purpose of civil emergency planning is to meet any
contingencies which may or do affect the welfare of populations, whether
through natural or other causes. These contingencies may range from
floods and earthquakes to political tension or armed conflict. Civil emergency planning thus deals with the availability of, requirements for and
application of resources in times of tension, crisis or war. As such, civil
emergency planning also includes protection of populations through civil
defense. In general terms, therefore, civil emergency planning is designed
to effect the optimum distribution and use of available resources in any
contingency situation. In this context, resources must be understood to
include not only industrial and agricultural products but also human resources, transport by land, sea and air and communications.
Typically, civil emergency plans are not put into execution until the
situation requires it, that is to say, in the event of a major natural disaster
or in a time of tension-when, for instance, there might be a scarcity of
certain basic products or an interruption in the normal pattern of supply.
Normally, both national and local authorities engage in civil emergency
planning. For almost 15 years there has been consultation on civil emergency planning within NATO.
Civil Emergency Planning in the United States
The United States has a great deal of experience with civil emergency
planning. This has been gained not only during World War 11 and subsequent military conflicts in which U.S. forces were engaged, but also as a
result of unexpected shortages, such as the interruption in the supply of oil
caused by the Mideast crisis of 1967, or of natural disasters, such as
Hurricane Beulah, which hit Texas and neighboring Mexico in September,
1967.
The principal coordinating responsibility for the planning functions of
the Executive Branch rests with the Office of Emergency Preparedness
Very little has been published regarding civil emergency planning at NATO. The
Information Service of the Organization has published, in THE ASPECTS OF NATO series, a
pamphlet entitled THE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING (October 1963). More
extensive information may be found in NATO, FACTS ABOUT THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION

139-144, 161 (1969). Brief references to civil emergency planning

may also be found in the NATO HANDBOOK (April 1969). A recent article about civil defense
also contains some interesting references to civil emergency planning. NATO LETTER, February 1969, p. 8.
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(OEP). 6 The OEP is part of the Executive Office of the President. The
importance of the OEP is enhanced by the fact that the Director of the
7
OEP is one of the statutory members of the National Security Council.
Many agencies and departments of the United States Government, however, also have, under OEP leadership, civil emergency planning responsibilities within their respective fields of authority. Thus, government
agencies such as the Office of Civil Defense and the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Interior and Transportation have planning responsibilities, respectively, in the fields of civil defense, agricultural production,
industrial production, petroleum, manpower and transportation. The
United States Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force have planning responsibilities for, respectively, matters involving land, sea and air
transport.
The function of coordinating the international aspects of these planning
roles of the United States Government in the area of civil emergency
planning rests with the Department of State, in close cooperation with the
OEP. With respect to NATO, this responsibility is exercised for the
Department by a section in the Office of NATO and Atlantic Political/Military Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs. At the United
States Mission to NATO in Brussels a Foreign Service Officer and a
United States Army Transportation Corps Officer are responsible for handling civil emergency planning in NATO.
Early Civil Emergency Planning in NATO
Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty8 provides:
In order more effectively to achieve' the objectives of this Treaty, the
Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help
and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
It was recognized from the beginning that in any future war there would
be two fronts: the military and the home front. These were regarded as
complementary and of equal importance. Indeed, it was thought that evident and visible weakness on the home front would be a temptation for a
potential enemy attack. Each member of the Alliance therefore developed
and maintained, pursuant to the Treaty, its civil potential in peacetime and
prepared for particular situations which might arise in time of war.
Originally, civil emergency planning measures were looked upon as
largely a national responsibility. The function of NATO consisted mostly
6

Exec. Order No. 11051 of Sept. 28, 1962, 27 FED. FEG. 9683, as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11075 of Jan. 16, 1963, 28 FED. REG. 473.
750 U.S.C. 2271, Reorganization Plan No. I of 1958.
"April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964; 34 UNTS 243.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
of providing mutual information and coordination. NATO also instituted a
process whereby the general state of preparedness throughout the Alliance
was assessed annually by the NATO Council.
In addition, civil emergency planning in NATO focused on the establishment of machinery which could be activated in wartime for the purpose
of coordinating the efforts of the members of the Alliance in the field of
agriculture and industrial production, transportation and civil defense.
Thus, civil emergency planning was largely occupied with the preparation
of plans for the so-called international civil wartime agencies-their functions, powers, staffing, location and other organizational and administrative
questions. To date, much of this work has been satisfactorily completed.
Current NATO Structure for Civil Emergency Planning
The policy direction and general coordination of civil emergency planning in NATO is the responsibility of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning
Committee. In plenary session, it is chaired by the Assistant Secretary
General for Defense Planning and Policy. 9 The members are national
representatives who are responsible for civil emergency planning in their
own countries. The United States is represented at plenary sessions of the
Senior Committee by the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness.
Recently, the Senior Committee has met once a year in plenary session
and monthly, or more often, in permanent session. In permanent session,
the Senior Committee is chaired by the Director of Civil Emergency
Planning, a high-ranking member of the NATO International Staff. The
members at permanent sessions are the resident civil emergency planning
officers attached to the NATO delegations. 10 In permanent sessions the
United States is represented in the Senior Committee by an officer of the
United States Mission to NATO.
The Senior Committee directs and supervises the activities of some eight
planning boards and committees, each of which has responsibilities in
defined areas of civil emergency planning. 11 These boards and committees
9

Nominally, the Senior Committee in Plenary Session is chaired by the Secretary
General. In practice, he has exercised this function only rarely. Recently the Secretary
General has played an increasingly active role with respect to civil emergency planning.
10
Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States have resident civil emergency
planning officers attached to their respective NATO delegations. Belgium, because of proximity, staffs its seat in the Senior Committee with officials from the appropriate Belgian Ministry
in Brussels. Denmark normally provides an official from Copenhagen. Iceland, Luxembourg
and Portugal have not regularly participated in the work of the Senior Committee, although of
late both Iceland and Portugal have shown more interest in the work of civil emergency
planning.
"These are the Civil Aviation Planning Committee, the Civil Communications Planning
Committee, the Civil Defense Committee, the Food and Agriculture Planning Committee, the
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meet periodically and perform several useful services. They bring together
government officials and experts who are responsible in their own countries
for given areas of emergency planning. They also prepare studies on
specific subjects in the field of their expertise. Finally, they have had a
hand in planning the organization of NATO machinery which would, in
time of war, take on the functions of coordinating the actions of NATO
countries in various fields, such as the allocation of resources, air, sea, rail
and road transport, civil defense and refugees.
Within the NATO International Staff there is a Directorate of Civil
Emergency Planning consisting of a Director-who also chairs permanent
sessions of the Senior Committee-a Deputy and three officers, for general
plans and policy, resources management and transport. The Directorate
acts as a focal point for the exchange of information among members. It
also functions as technical adviser-across the whole spectrum of civil
emergency planning-to the Senior Committee and the various boards and
committees under its jurisdiction. In practice, the Directorate also prepares
papers for discussion in the Senior Committee and other boards and committees and, therefore, is in a position of exercising considerable leadership.
The Traditional Role of Civil Emergency Planning in NATO
Until recently the focus of civil emergency planning in NATO has been
on the perfection of plans for the operation of the so-called civil wartime
agencies. These agencies are designed to become operational at a point in
time-tied in with the NATO Alert System-when general war is believed
to be around the corner. The primary function of these agencies would be
to insure for the opening phase of a war survival of the populations,
maintenance of government control and support for military operations
and, later on, to assist Alliance efforts for the early rehabilitation and
economic recovery of member states.
The system has twice been tested in exercises, known as CIVLOG 65
and CIVLOG 69. There exercises have provided an evaluation of the
operational readiness of the wartime agencies and their ability to carry out
their assigned functions under simulated post-nuclear attack conditions.
As may be seen, the focus has been almost entirely on the period
following general nuclear exchange. Traditional civil emergency planning
has had little if any room for an active civil emergency planning function
prior to general nuclear exchange.
Industrial Planning Committee, the Petroleum Planning Committee, the Planning Board on
European Inland Transport, and the Planning Board on Ocean Shipping.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2

INTERNATIONAL

LA WYER

The New NATO Strategy and Civil Emergency Planning
Until 1967, NATO adhered at least formally to what in essence) was a
strategy of instant nuclear response. It is no surprise, therefore, that in this
context civil emergency planning was focused almost exclusively on the
jobs to be tackled after general nuclear exchange: survival of populations,
maintenance of government control, support of military operations and
international resupply of essential resources. At the Meeting of Ministers
in December 1967, however, the Defense Planning Committee of NATO
(that is to say, the members of NATO without France) adopted a new
strategy of flexible response. In essence, this strategy is to have available a
wide choice of possible responses to meet enemy actions and to leave the
enemy uncertain with which response or combination of possible responses
he will be confronted. It became clear that in the context of the new
strategy, civil emergency planning should no longer merely be concerned
with the post-nuclear exchange period but should embrace the whole spectrum of contingencies, from time of tension and crisis to general nuclear
war. The focus of civil emergency planning, therefore, had to shift. Civil
emergency planning no longer could be confined to what was to be done
after general nuclear exchange-though this remained of importance-but
should concentrate, instead, on what plans and procedures should be available prior to nuclear exchange, even at the lower end of the contingency
spectrum.
Recent NATO Action on Civil Emergency Planning
Late in 1967 the Senior Committee, in plenary session, decided that the
assumptions on which civil emergency planning had been based should be
revised to bring them into line with the new NATO strategy. In the course
of 1968, the Senior Committee accordingly engaged in a thorough exchange of views which led to the adoption of a set of revised basic
assumptions. These revised assumptions constituted a modest but successful attempt to tie civil emergency planning conceptually into the new
NATO strategy of flexible response.
The Senior Committee, following a United States initiative, also organized a symposium which was held in February, 1969, and which considered the implications of the revised basic assumptions. Some two hundred
experts-military and civilian-from NATO countries, the International
Staff, and the major NATO Commands attended the symposium. The
symposium carried out its work in four panels which dealt respectively
with the problem of activation of the civil wartime agencies, resources
management, transport and civil defense. These four panels each produced
highly interesting and worthwhile reports. At present the Senior CoinInternational Lawyer, Vol. 4. No. 2
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mittee is engaged in an effort to convert the findings of the symposium into
a process by which they may be acted upon by governments. In this
connection, plans are being laid for the holding of a case study in which
government representatives will be asked to test their civil emergency
planning, and the coordination of.this planning within NATO, on the basis
of a number of hypothetical crisis situations involving tension, local conventional conflict and general conventional war. The results of the case
study, combined with those of CIVLOG 69, will provide an
across-the-board evaluation of the ability of current civil emergency plans
to be responsive to any situation across the contingency spectrum.
The Role of France
The French position with respect to civil emergency planning at NATO
has been ambivalent and difficult. When France withdrew its forces from
the integrated NATO Commands, the Organization accommodated itself
to the new situation by proceeding to handle the management of defense
questions in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) which, in fact, is
nothing other than the NATO Council without France. At the time,
France also ceased to be represented in other NATO committees dealing
with defense questions.
Civil emergency planning is in substantial measure a coefficient of defense planning. France, therefore, faced the question whether to continue
to participate in the work of the Senior Committee. Until now she has done
so, although her role in the Senior Committee has not been made easy by
the fact that France was not in a position to accept, even by implication,
any part of the new NATO strategy of flexible response. The other members of the Senior Committee have taken the position that they hope
France will continue to participate. They have, however, shown that they
are not prepared to let French reluctance stymie progress in recasting civil
emergency planning to fit the new NATO strategy and the current needs of
the Alliance.
The Future of Civil Emergency Planning
In recent years the world-and NATO-has seen a good many crises. It
is clear that civil emergency planning in NATO will have a new, and much
enlarged role to play. The revised basic assumptions for civil emergency
planning, while a big step forward, do not make it easy to say with
precision exactly what the role should be. One thing, however, is clear:
civil emergency planning will have to be ready to deal with a much larger
variety of contingency situations than has been the case until recently.
NATO Governments and the Organization itself will, therefore, have to
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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re-think what purposes civil emergency planning should have, and how
they may best be fulfilled.
Uncertain though the future may be, certain tentative conclusions are
nevertheless beginning to emerge. One is that whatever NATO machinery
there will be to implement civil emergency plans, it should be sufficiently
flexible to operate even at the lower end of the contingency spectrum. This
will pose new and challenging problems in fields such as staffing, organization and control. Another conclusion is that there will be a need for a data
bank which will provide planning committees, military headquarters and
capitals with up-to-date information on availability of resources. A third
conclusion recognizes a need for greater flexibility in the use of available
transport resources. It is no longer possible to compartmentalize air, rail,
road and sea transport in their respective convenient cubbyholes. Henceforth there will have to be coordination of transportation availabilities and
requirements across the board. The energy with which these conclusions
are worked out and implemented will provide new strength to the Alliance.
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